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DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20251203T115000
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DTSTAMP:20260412T114203
CREATED:20251108T002424Z
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SUMMARY:Applied Microeconomics and Trade Seminar Series presents: Matt Weinberg
DESCRIPTION:Applied Microeconomics and Trade Seminar\nDate: Wednesday\, December 3\, 2025\nTime: 11:50am – 1:10 p.m.\nLocation: E2-499\n\n \n\nSpeaker: Matt Weinberg \nTitle: Professor of Economics \nAffiliation: Ohio State University\nHost: Jon Robinson\n \nSeminar title: Oligopsony and Collective Bargaining: Evidence from K-12 Teachers \n\nABSTRACT:  Employers facing limited labor market competition may suppress wages below socially optimal levels. Unions can counteract this wage suppression through collective bargaining\, though the may also push wages above the socially optimal level. To assess these forces\, we estimate a structural model of labor supply\, labor demand\, and Nashin-Nash bargaining over wages between teacher unions and school districts in Pennsylvania’s K-12 public school system from 2013 to 2020. Using the estimated parameters\, we compare negotiated equilibrium wages and employment to the pure oligopsony scenario and the social planner scenario. On average\, pure oligopsony reduces wages 16 percent below the social optimum\, while collective bargaining raises wages by 9 percent above the optimum. This average masks substantial district-level heterogeneity driven by variation in bargaining power. Twenty-seven percent of schools have negotiated salaries below the social optimum due to cross-district externalities\, where high salaries at one school lead to hiring reductions\, which increase labor supply in competing districts. 
URL:https://events.ucsc.edu/event/applied-microeconomics-and-trade-seminar-series-presents-matt-weinberg/
LOCATION:Engineering 2\, Engineering 2 1156 High Street\, Santa Cruz\, CA\, 95064
CATEGORIES:Seminars
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DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20251204T134000
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DTSTAMP:20260412T114203
CREATED:20251108T001824Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251120T170815Z
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SUMMARY:Behavioral\, Econometrics and Theory Seminar Series Presents: Jacopo Magnani
DESCRIPTION:Economics Behavioral\, Econometrics\, & Theory Seminar\nDate: Thursday\, December 4\, 2025\nTime: 1:40-3:00 p.m.\nLocation: E2-499\n\n \n\nSpeaker: Jacopo Magnani \nTitle:  Associate Professor of Economics \nAffiliation: Norwegian University of Science and Technology\, visiting Caltech\nHost: Kristian Lopez Vargas\n \nSeminar title: Behavioral Limits to Complete Markets\n \nABSTRACT:  Standard economic theory predicts that individuals should prefer complete markets to incomplete markets\, as the former allow state-contingent claims for every possible outcome. Yet real-world markets remain incomplete\, and the demand-side origins of the phenomenon are poorly understood. We develop an experimental framework to examine whether investors may themselves prefer incomplete markets\, and highlight two potential mechanisms: preference instability\, which exposes agents to greater regret or temptation in complete markets\, and complexity costs\, which arise because higher dimensionality increases cognitive effort and errors. In our experiment\, participants consistently reveal a preference for in complete markets\, contradicting the rational benchmark. Comparing homegrown and induced-preference treatments\, we find no evidence that this behavior is driven by preference instability. Instead\, utility losses\, response times\, and subjective ratings indicate that complexity costs drive the preference for incompleteness. Structural estimation confirms that complete markets are several times more complex than incomplete ones\, providing a behavioral foundation for market incompleteness. 
URL:https://events.ucsc.edu/event/behavioral-econometrics-and-theory-seminar-series-presents-jacopo-magnani/
LOCATION:Engineering 2\, Engineering 2 1156 High Street\, Santa Cruz\, CA\, 95064
CATEGORIES:Seminars
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