BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Events - ECPv6.15.20//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:Events
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://events.ucsc.edu
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Events
REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H
X-Robots-Tag:noindex
X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:America/Los_Angeles
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0800
TZOFFSETTO:-0700
TZNAME:PDT
DTSTART:20250309T100000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0700
TZOFFSETTO:-0800
TZNAME:PST
DTSTART:20251102T090000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0800
TZOFFSETTO:-0700
TZNAME:PDT
DTSTART:20260308T100000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0700
TZOFFSETTO:-0800
TZNAME:PST
DTSTART:20261101T090000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0800
TZOFFSETTO:-0700
TZNAME:PDT
DTSTART:20270314T100000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0700
TZOFFSETTO:-0800
TZNAME:PST
DTSTART:20271107T090000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20260120T134000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20260120T150000
DTSTAMP:20260417T063405
CREATED:20251211T224823Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260108T184635Z
UID:10005827-1768916400-1768921200@events.ucsc.edu
SUMMARY:Behavioral\, Econometrics and Theory Seminar Series Presents: Roberto Corrao
DESCRIPTION:Economics Behavioral\, Econometrics\, & Theory Seminar\nDate: Tuesday\, January 20\, 2026\nTime: 1:40-3:00 p.m.\nLocation: E2-499\n\n \n\nSpeaker: Roberto Corrao\nTitle:  Assistant Professor of Economics \nAffiliation:  Stanford University\nHost: Gerelt Tserenjigmid\n \nSeminar title: Contractibility Design\n \nABSTRACT: \nWe introduce a model of incentive contracting in which the principal\, in addition to\nwriting contracts\, must engage in contractibility design: creating an evidence structure\nthat allows them to prove when the agent has breached the contract. Designing an\nevidence structure entails both (i) front-end costs borne ex ante\, such as those of\ndrafting contracts\, and (ii) back-end costs borne ex post\, such as those of generating\nevidence. We find that\, under even small front-end costs\, optimal contracts are coarse\,\nspecifying finitely many contingencies out of a continuum of possibilities. In contrast\,\nunder even large back-end costs\, optimal contracts are complete. Applied to the design\nof procurement contracts\, our results rationalize: (i) the discreteness of contracts\, (ii)\nthe presence of similarly vague contracts in low-stakes and high-stakes settings\, and\n(iii) the discontinuous adjustment of contracts to changes in the economic environment.
URL:https://events.ucsc.edu/event/behavioral-econometrics-and-theory-seminar-series-presents-roberto-corrao/
LOCATION:Engineering 2\, Engineering 2 1156 High Street\, Santa Cruz\, CA\, 95064
CATEGORIES:Seminars
GEO:37.0009723;-122.0632371
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=Engineering 2 Engineering 2 1156 High Street Santa Cruz CA 95064;X-APPLE-RADIUS=500;X-TITLE=Engineering 2 1156 High Street:geo:-122.0632371,37.0009723
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20260122T014000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20260122T014000
DTSTAMP:20260417T063405
CREATED:20251211T230012Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260108T184752Z
UID:10005828-1769046000-1769046000@events.ucsc.edu
SUMMARY:Applied Microeconomics and Trade Seminar Series Presents: Guo Xu
DESCRIPTION:Applied Microeconomics and Trade Seminar\nDate: Thursday\, January 22\, 2026\nTime: 1:40 – 3:00 p.m.\nLocation: E2-499\n\n \n\nSpeaker: Guo Xu\nTitle: Associate Professor of Economics \nAffiliation: University of California\, Berkeley  \nHost: Ajay Shenoy \n  \nSeminar title: Personnel is Policy: Delegation and Political Misalignment in the Rulemaking Process\n\nABSTRACT: We combine comprehensive data on the U.S. federal rulemaking process with individuallevel personnel and voter registration records to study the consequences of partisan misalignment between regulators and the president. We present three main results. First\, even important pieces of new regulation are frequently delegated to bureaucrats who are politically misaligned. Second\, rules that are overseen by misaligned regulators take systematically longer to complete\, are more verbose\, generate more negative feedback from the public\, and are more likely to be challenged in court. Third\, in assigning regulators to rules\, agency leaders often face a sharp tradeoff between political alignment and expertise. Agency frictions notwithstanding\, they tend to resolve this tradeoff in favor of expertise.
URL:https://events.ucsc.edu/event/applied-microeconomics-and-trade-seminar-series-presents-guo-xu/
LOCATION:Engineering 2\, Engineering 2 1156 High Street\, Santa Cruz\, CA\, 95064
CATEGORIES:Seminars
GEO:37.0009723;-122.0632371
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=Engineering 2 Engineering 2 1156 High Street Santa Cruz CA 95064;X-APPLE-RADIUS=500;X-TITLE=Engineering 2 1156 High Street:geo:-122.0632371,37.0009723
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR