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DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20260120T134000
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DTSTAMP:20260426T040528
CREATED:20251211T224823Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260108T184635Z
UID:10005827-1768916400-1768921200@events.ucsc.edu
SUMMARY:Behavioral\, Econometrics and Theory Seminar Series Presents: Roberto Corrao
DESCRIPTION:Economics Behavioral\, Econometrics\, & Theory Seminar\nDate: Tuesday\, January 20\, 2026\nTime: 1:40-3:00 p.m.\nLocation: E2-499\n\n \n\nSpeaker: Roberto Corrao\nTitle:  Assistant Professor of Economics \nAffiliation:  Stanford University\nHost: Gerelt Tserenjigmid\n \nSeminar title: Contractibility Design\n \nABSTRACT: \nWe introduce a model of incentive contracting in which the principal\, in addition to\nwriting contracts\, must engage in contractibility design: creating an evidence structure\nthat allows them to prove when the agent has breached the contract. Designing an\nevidence structure entails both (i) front-end costs borne ex ante\, such as those of\ndrafting contracts\, and (ii) back-end costs borne ex post\, such as those of generating\nevidence. We find that\, under even small front-end costs\, optimal contracts are coarse\,\nspecifying finitely many contingencies out of a continuum of possibilities. In contrast\,\nunder even large back-end costs\, optimal contracts are complete. Applied to the design\nof procurement contracts\, our results rationalize: (i) the discreteness of contracts\, (ii)\nthe presence of similarly vague contracts in low-stakes and high-stakes settings\, and\n(iii) the discontinuous adjustment of contracts to changes in the economic environment.
URL:https://events.ucsc.edu/event/behavioral-econometrics-and-theory-seminar-series-presents-roberto-corrao/
LOCATION:Engineering 2\, Engineering 2 1156 High Street\, Santa Cruz\, CA\, 95064
CATEGORIES:Seminars
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